This paper summarizes our earlier research documenting the characteristic speculative dynamics of many asset markets and suggests a framework for understanding them.
The 1987 stock market crash demonstrated more convincingly than any econometric test ever could that not all movements in asset prices can be accounted for by news about fundamental values.
The efficient markets hypothesis was probably the right place for serious research on asset valuation to begin, but it may be the wrong place for it to end. In this paper, we review some of our research directed at providing an alternative framework for thinking about fluctuations in speculative prices.
As proponents of the efficient markets hypothesis stress, repeated analysis of the single time series on U.S. stock returns is bound to turn up patterns sooner or later.
Our research has therefore sought to determine whether there are regularities that appear not just in U.S. equity returns, but also in returns in other countries' stock markets, and in other assets. Given that risk factors are likely to operate differently in different markets, finding common patterns across markets suggests the need for consideration of the speculative process itself.
After summarizing our earlier research documenting the characteristic speculative dynamics of many asset markets, we go on to suggest a framework for understanding them. Our model incorporates "feedback traders," traders whose demand is based on the history of past returns rather than the expectation of future fundamentals. We use this framework to describe ways in which the characteristic return patterns might be generated, and also to address the long-standing question of whether profitable speculation stabilizes asset markets.
I.
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The excess returns on all assets are measured as nominal returns less the short term interest rate. These returns are monthly for all assets except houses (quarterly) and collectibles (annual) .
For all assets except gold, the standard errors in parentheses correspond to the standard error of the average autocorrelation across markets. The regression coefficient in the last column is the result of estimating an equation for 48-month returns using the logarithm of the ratio of fundamental value to the current asset price as the explanatory variable.
The fundamentals are defined for each asset in the text.
The values in brackets are the probability of observing regression coefficients at least as positive as the reported value. These p values are based on Monte Carlo simulations described in detail in Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1990). signal are optimal if autocorrelations are at first positive and then negative.
Third, in most cases, returns over periods of several years can be predicted on the basis of crude proxies for the deviation of asset prices from fundamental value.
For each market, we defined a proxy "fundamental value": a constant multiple of dividends in the case of stocks, the reciprocal of the short-term interest rate for bonds, and a constant real exchange rate and real gold price. The last column reports regression coefficients from equations relating subsequent forty-eight month excess returns to the logarithm of the current fundamental-price ratio.
In the markets for equities and gold, and to a lesser extent foreign exchange, these measures have substantial forecast power for returns. The result for equities suggests that forty percent of the deviation between price and our fundamental value measure is eliminated within forty-eight months. Similar evidence for house prices is presented by Karl Case and Robert Shiller (1989), who show that the real cpaital gain on houses can be forecast using lagged values of the rental-to-price ratio. They also show that over horizons longer than those in Table 1 Although this could be attributed to investor perceptions that equities were safer than they had been in the past, a more plausible account is taht investor demand for equities was fueled by expected large capital gains from a continuing bull market.
Third, Poterba and Summers (1988) show that for specifications of the equity risk process which are consistent with empirical findings on volatility, increases in risk which raise future required returns should reduce current returns, thus leading to negative autocorrelation at high frequencies. John Campbell and Robert Shiller (1989) ((5,<0) . Positive returns associated with favorable shocks to fundamentals reduce asset demand from negative feedback investors. Rational investors must take offsetting long positions, so expected returns to these investors must rise. On average, subsequent returns will therefore be higher, and returns will be positively serially correlated. The higher returns will show up as capital gains on the asset so that, as with the earlier case, the initial price reaction to the news will be incomplete. Negative feedback trading by central banks "leaning into the wind" to delay the incorporation of news into exchange rates has been advanced as a possible explanation for positive autocorrelation in currency returns. In the long run, however, prices must change by only the amount of the fundamental shock. This implies that returns must be negatively serially correlated over some horizons.
IV. Can Profitable Speculation Lead to Instability?
Models with heterogeneous traders can be used to study a variety of issues concerning the performance of asset markets.
We illustrate this by examining the effects of speculation on price stability. The traditional view, presented for example by Milton Friedman (1953) , holds that profitable speculationbuying when prices are low and selling when they are high -will offset other market shocks and thereby stabilize prices.
DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) Table 2 shows, returns exhibit positive first-order autocorrelation, but are negatively serially correlated at two and three lags.
For this case, a speculator following a positive-feedback investment rule over short horizons would earn profits. Table 2 shows that while an increase in this type of speculation (an increase in 5-,) 
